Steve Owaduge, 2016
Introduction
The impeachment of Governor Rashidi Ladoja of Oyo State in January 2006 remains one of the most controversial episodes in Nigeria’s democratic experiment under the Fourth Republic. It provides a case study of how patron–client politics, institutional weaknesses, and the instrumentalization of violence by political elites undermined constitutional democracy. Far from being a purely legal exercise of legislative oversight, the impeachment was deeply enmeshed in the struggle between Ladoja and his erstwhile political benefactor, Chief Lamidi Adedibu, who commanded extensive influence within the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and maintained a vast network of street-level enforcers through the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW). The involvement of the Deputy Governor, Chief Adebayo Alao-Akala, and the tacit support of President Olusegun Obasanjo further complicated the crisis, raising questions about the role of godfatherism, federal interference, and political violence in Nigerian governance. This essay reconstructs the untold story of the impeachment, examining the political feud, the manipulation of legislative procedures, the role of violent actors, and the eventual judicial reversal that shaped Nigeria’s democratic jurisprudence.
Political Background: The Ladoja–Adedibu Fallout
Rashidi Ladoja was elected governor in 2003 under the platform of the PDP, largely through the influence of Chief Lamidi Adedibu, a political strongman popularly dubbed the “garrison commander” of Ibadan politics (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2007). Adedibu’s role as a kingmaker was openly acknowledged by the PDP national chairman, Ahmadu Ali, who insisted that Ladoja should consult Adedibu in all political decisions (HRW, 2007). The alliance soon disintegrated over control of patronage, with disputes centering on appointments, contracts, and the allocation of motor park revenues, an important economic and political resource in Oyo State (Omotola, 2007). Ladoja resisted Adedibu’s demands for a greater share of state patronage, prompting Adedibu to mobilize his extensive political machinery against the governor. President Obasanjo, who was engaged in consolidating power for his controversial third-term agenda, appeared to align with Adedibu, thereby isolating Ladoja within the national party structure (Albert, 2005).
Political Violence and the Role of NURTW Factions
The battle between Ladoja and Adedibu was not waged solely in the realm of party politics. Both factions relied heavily on the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) to enforce their authority on the streets. Rival gangs controlled by NURTW warlords became proxies in the political contest. Lateef Akinsola, popularly known as “Tokyo,” was a staunch ally of Adedibu and Alao-Akala, and his faction played a prominent role in violently confronting Ladoja’s supporters (HRW, 2007). In contrast, Wasilu Adegboyega (“Tawa”) aligned with Ladoja, but his followers were subjected to targeted attacks, including his abduction and assault by pro-Tokyo gangs (Ojo, 2010). Another figure, Lateef Salako (“Eleweomo”), emerged as a notorious enforcer, reportedly deployed during the legal tussles surrounding Ladoja’s reinstatement (ThisDay, 2006). These violent confrontations resulted in injuries, abductions, and political assassinations, reflecting the extent to which political thuggery had become institutionalized in Oyo politics. The deployment of violence was not incidental but central to sustaining political control and intimidating opponents, thereby undermining democratic competition.
The Impeachment Process and Constitutional Breaches
The legislative removal of Ladoja was orchestrated through irregular and unconstitutional means. In December 2005, a faction of the Oyo State House of Assembly, often referred to as the “G-18,” convened at D’Rovans Hotel in Ibadan rather than at the constitutionally designated Assembly chambers (Inakoju v. Adeleke, 2006). In these extrajudicial sittings, they introduced articles of impeachment against the governor. By 12 January 2006, the faction had declared Ladoja impeached and swiftly swore in his deputy, Adebayo Alao-Akala, as governor (HRW, 2007). However, the impeachment process violated key provisions of Section 188 of the 1999 Constitution, including the requirement for a two-thirds majority of all Assembly members, proper service of allegations on the governor, and the conduct of proceedings in the official legislative venue (Akinsanya & Idowu, 2011). These breaches underscored the extent to which constitutional safeguards could be manipulated in the pursuit of political objectives.
Federal Involvement and the Role of Obasanjo
President Obasanjo’s role in the impeachment crisis remains contested but significant. While he did not directly order the removal of Ladoja, his tacit support for Adedibu and Alao-Akala emboldened the factional lawmakers. Ladoja himself repeatedly alleged that his refusal to endorse Obasanjo’s third-term ambition contributed to his removal (Akinola, 2014). Moreover, the federal government’s security apparatus failed to intervene to prevent the unconstitutional impeachment, thereby signaling Abuja’s complicity. The crisis thus illustrates how federal executive power was indirectly deployed to settle intra-party disputes and discipline disloyal governors. It also reflected the dynamics of godfatherism, whereby local strongmen like Adedibu were empowered by federal patronage to dominate state politics (Omilusi, 2015).
Judicial Reversal and the Restoration of Ladoja
The judiciary eventually emerged as the decisive arbiter in the impeachment crisis. On 1 November 2006, the Court of Appeal in Ibadan declared the impeachment null and void, ruling that the House of Assembly had failed to comply with constitutional provisions (Ojo, 2010). The decision was upheld by the Supreme Court on 7 December 2006 in the landmark case Inakoju v. Adeleke (SC.272/2006). The Court emphasized strict adherence to the procedures outlined in Section 188, thereby setting a precedent that curtailed the arbitrary use of impeachment as a political weapon (Nwabueze, 2007). Following the judgment, Ladoja was reinstated on 12 December 2006 under heavy police protection, though the underlying political tensions persisted. His reinstatement was short-lived, as he completed only a few months in office before the 2007 elections returned Alao-Akala as governor with Adedibu’s backing.
Implications for Nigerian Democracy
The impeachment of Ladoja highlights the fragility of Nigeria’s democratic institutions in the face of entrenched patronage networks, federal interference, and the weaponization of violence. The crisis demonstrated how state assemblies could be manipulated to serve the interests of powerful political godfathers rather than act as independent guardians of the constitution. It also underscored the role of non-state actors, particularly transport unions and political thugs, in shaping electoral and governance outcomes. Yet, the judiciary’s intervention provided a measure of resilience, affirming the supremacy of constitutional processes over partisan scheming. The decision in Inakoju v. Adeleke remains a milestone in Nigerian constitutional jurisprudence, serving as a safeguard against the misuse of impeachment powers.
Conclusion
The untold story of Governor Rashidi Ladoja’s impeachment reveals more than a personal feud between a governor and his godfather; it encapsulates the broader challenges of Nigerian democracy, including the corrosive influence of godfatherism, the fusion of politics with violence, and the complicity of federal power in subverting due process. While the judiciary’s eventual nullification of the impeachment reaffirmed the rule of law, the episode exposed the institutional weaknesses that allow political elites to weaponize state institutions and non-state actors for personal gain. In the final analysis, the Ladoja impeachment saga serves as both a cautionary tale and a landmark in Nigeria’s democratic trajectory: a cautionary tale of how easily democratic structures can be hijacked by patronage and coercion, and a landmark of judicial intervention that, at least temporarily, preserved constitutionalism amidst pervasive political lawlessness.
References
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- Akinsanya, A. A., & Idowu, B. (2011). Constitutional democracy, separation of powers and the impeachment process in Nigeria. Journal of Social Sciences, 27(3), 199–216.
- Albert, I. O. (2005). Explaining ‘godfatherism’ in Nigerian politics. African Sociological Review, 9(2), 79–105.
- Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2007). Criminal politics: Violence, “godfathers” and corruption in Nigeria. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Inakoju v. Adeleke (2006) 4 NWLR (Pt. 972) 496 (Supreme Court of Nigeria).
- Nwabueze, B. O. (2007). Constitutional democracy in Africa (Vol. 4). Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
- Ojo, E. O. (2010). The legislature and the politics of impeachment in Nigeria, 1999–2007. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 28(1), 69–82.
- Omilusi, M. (2015). Godfatherism and political clientelism in Nigeria. International Journal of Politics and Good Governance, 6(6.2), 1–20.
- Omotola, J. S. (2007). Godfathers and the 2007 Nigerian general elections. Journal of African Elections, 6(2), 134–152.
- ThisDay Newspaper. (2006, December 13). Ladoja returns to office amid tight security.
(c) Steve Owaduge July, 2016.
